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Abstract Since 2001 there has been a proliferation of commercially-available
devices that observe children, track their movements and gather data about the
routine choices that they make. At the same time, a growing number of databases in
education, social care, health and youth justice store detailed information about
children and facilitate its sharing between agencies. Some of this data is derived
from in-depth personal assessment tools that are believed to ‘predict’ poor life
outcomes such as criminality or social exclusion. These developments are often
presented as a means of keeping children safe or of intervening to deal with
problems promptly, but they leave children with little privacy and create a new set of
ethical and practical difficulties. There are dangers that overloading an already
stretched social care service with low-level concerns will damage effective child
protection work, while any insecurity in the systems potentially puts all children at
increased risk of harm. Issues around consent to data-sharing have not been
adequately addressed, but the reduction in confidentiality brought about by routine
inter-agency information-sharing may deter children and their families from
accessing services at all. We risk habituating children to a very high level of
surveillance, and yet the possible effect of such widespread data-gathering on their
personal development and future lives has not been considered. This paper lists some
of the systems now in use or being planned, and outlines the potential risks that they
pose to children’s safety and development.
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Introduction
Children unquestionably have a right to a private life. This is guaranteed by Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and underlined by Article 16 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by the UK in 1991. Although
other rights to life, health and development may sometimes weigh more heavily in
the balance, privacy is still as fundamental to children as it is to adults. The right to
privacy encapsulates the knowledge of its importance for individual identity and
mental health.
Developments in the use of Information Technology threaten to destroy children’s
privacy. When technology is combined with an adult-centric view of children as
human beings in-the-making rather than subjects of rights in the present, it threatens
to create a society in which children no longer have private lives at all. We risk
habituating children to a very high level of surveillance, but the ethical issues that
this raises, the new difficulties it creates and the potential effects of monitoring, data-
gathering and information sharing on children’s personal development and future
lives have not been considered. A zero-privacy approach to child-rearing is likely to
have unintended consequences that will exacerbate the very problems that gadgetry
and databases are apparently designed to solve.
More than a decade ago, the cultural historian Marina Warner observed in the
Reith Lectures:
Childhood placed at a tangent to adulthood, perceived as special and magical,
precious and dangerous at once, has turned into some volatile stuff—hydrogen,
or mercury, which has to be contained. The separate condition of the child has
never been so bounded by thinking, so established in law as it is today.
(Warner 1994: 30)
It is this otherness of children that allows adults to objectify them. Their perceived
‘preciousness and dangerousness’ create an atmosphere in which we believe that
children must be watched closely in order to curb the monsters that may prey upon
them, or those that lie in wait within children themselves, and that sacrificing
children’s privacy rights is a fair price to pay.
We fear that children will be abducted, harmed, corrupted or bullied. That they
will get fat, play truant, watch too much television and never so much as look at a
book. We worry that they will fail to get jobs and will grow up to be criminals. In
fact, given children’s capacity to live up to adults’ expectations, it’s surprising that so
many survive our doomsday prognoses for them.
These popular anxieties provide a fruitful sales pitch for anything that adults
believe will help in their quest to steer children past the lurking dangers. Whether it
be a parenting manual, monitoring and surveillance gadget, or a system that collates
information and promises to nip problems in the bud, a product or initiative needs
only the tag of child protection, education or the prevention of delinquency in order
to find a receptive market.
Consequently, developments in a wide range of arenas are having a cumulative
effect on children’s privacy and their interactions with adults. In this article, I shall
outline the innovations taking place in the use of technology to watch and regulate
children, beginning with its use by parents to monitor their own children, by teachers
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to control their behaviour at school, and by the State to watch their development and
screen for early signs of trouble.
CCTV and Webcams
Recently, a head teacher in Manchester justified his decision to install CCTV
cameras throughout his school (including in the toilets) as follows:
They’ve definitely proved their worth because pupils know they’re being
watched 24 hours a day. There are cameras on the corridors, in all the
communal spaces and outside on the playground. (Manchester Evening News
2007)
There seems to be no room here for doubt that children need intensive
surveillance and, while the 24-h claim may be an obvious exaggeration, it is
nonetheless true that if the full range of available devices were used on any
particular child, she could be under constant physical surveillance.
It is not only schools in which CCTV cameras are proliferating. There is a
growing trend towards the use of webcams in pre-school settings. Parents, and others
nominated by them, are able to log on to a dedicated website at any time in order to
watch their toddler at play. Since the camera covers the entire room, all observers see
every child and adult present. While advertising material focuses on webcams as a
way of fostering parental involvement in their children’s lives, a Danish study of the
use of nursery webcams concludes that they are a useful means of bridging the gap
between ‘traditional society’ and ‘radicalised modernity’ and could help parents who
experience: ‘difficulties accepting the decreasing importance of the family in the
socialization of the child.’ (Jørgensen 2004)
Webcams are thus seen as important for parents, and in promoting a political
agenda, but children are, paradoxically, invisible. No attention is paid to the potential
problems of allowing large numbers of people to observe the daily lives of children
too young to offer consent. Quite apart from any child protection implications, there
is no apparent recognition that webcams undermine the dignity of a baby or toddler.
Moreover, the assertion that they permit ‘parental involvement’ is simply
misleading: one-sided observation cannot constitute a reciprocal relationship; it
merely reinforces the idea of a child as a passive object of adult scrutiny. One can
only imagine the confusion a small child might feel were his parents to comment on
the events of his day when they had not actually been present.
Mobile location
There is another growing market in mobile phones with which parents can track the
whereabouts of their children. Some include a feature that allows parents to set a
physical boundary or key in a regular route, and receive an alert if the child deviates
from this. Typically, the advertising appeals to parental perceptions of ‘stranger
danger’ and suggests that the product can bring parents ‘peace of mind’, but this is
illusory: all that parents can know is the whereabouts of their child’s phone but not
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whether it is still in the child’s possession. Any false sense of security may increase
the risk that a child who is, in reality, not yet competent to be out alone will meet the
more likely danger of a traffic accident.
It is hard to see how a child’s independence is fostered by powerful messages that
the outside world is a predatory place so full of dangers that they cannot possibly
cope alone. Whilst it is understandable that parents would prefer to avoid the
inevitable anxiety of their child’s first essays in independence, it is that very anxiety
that ensures they weigh up the risks and equip their children to handle the
unexpected. The ultimate goal of parenthood is, after all, to bring a child to
competent, confident maturity.
Biometrics
During the last five years, increasing numbers of schools have installed library,
canteen and registration systems that monitor and analyse children’s habits, such as
their choice of reading matter (including by age, ethnicity and gender) or their
individual school meal choices.
Typically these systems scan children’s fingerprints in order to increase efficiency
and eliminate such problems as lost library cards. They are also promoted as a means
of addressing a catalogue of current anxieties: advertising straplines include such
assertions as: ‘A cashless system is an effective anti-bullying tool’; ‘The scheme
promotes healthy eating’; ‘Pupils are happy to borrow and return books’.
After undertaking a literature review of the use of children’s biometrics, Dr Sandra
Leaton-Gray of Homerton College, Cambridge contacted the campaign group, ‘Leave
Them Kids Alone’ to inform them that:
I have not been able to find a single piece of published research which suggests
that the use of biometrics in schools promotes healthy eating or improves
reading skills amongst children. I am concerned that these reasons are being
given as a justification for fingerprinting children. There is absolutely no
evidence for such claims. (Leaton-Gray 2007)
There is currently no requirement for schools to seek parental consent before taking
a child’s fingerprints, and the Information Commissioner has said that the practice does
not raise data protection problems. Manufacturers have attempted to calm the mounting
anxiety amongst parents by asserting that the data derived from a fingerprint cannot be
reverse-engineered, and that the systems are protected by 128-bit encryption.
Even were such statements to be reassuring, they do nothing to counter concerns that
children are becoming habituated to giving up their irreplaceable biometrics for low-
level purposes; that schools are not secure environments; that data is not fully cleansed
from systems when a child leaves the school and that security cannot be guaranteed in
the years to come. On the issue of the potential use of biometrics by other agencies or
individuals, Microsoft’s Chief Identity Architect, Kim Cameron, points out:
If you want to find out who owns a fingerprint, just convert the fingerprint to a
template and do a search for the template in one of these databases. Call the
template a binary number if you want to. The point is that all you need to save
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in the database is the number. Later, when you come across a “fingerprint of
interest”, you just convert it to a number and search for it. Law enforcement
can use this information - and so can criminals. (Cameron 2007)
Perhaps the final comment on this subject should go to the head teacher of a
school in York, who justified the invasiveness of taking children’s fingerprints as
preparation for life:
All the measures to do with ID cards will possibly invade their privacy even
further, but the world has no answer to terrorism without using these things and
I would see us as getting them ready for the world in which they will have to
live. (York Press 2007)
Databases and assessment systems: The School Census and National Pupil
Database (NPD)
The termly School Census provides a classic example of function-creep. While the
Education Act 1996 empowered the government to collect information about pupils
directly from schools, this specifically could not include the name of any pupil.
Since then, a series of amendments and regulations has changed that situation to
enable a regular ‘pupil level’ (individual) census of every pupil in a state-maintained
school. The range of information collected has also increased incrementally to more
than 40 individual-level data items, including attendance and behaviour data.
Because the legislation requires schools to supply the data, a statutory gateway
that provides an exception to certain requirements of the Data Protection Act, parents
and children are not asked for consent. Data is taken directly from schools’
management systems, and also from pre-school providers, including childminders,
via the local authority.
Once collected, the information is held on the National Pupil Database (NPD).
Initially the government maintained that:
The Department has no interest in the identity of individual pupils as such, and
will be using the database solely for statistical purposes, with only technical
staff directly engaged in the data collation process having access to pupil
names. (Timms, January 2002)
In this same written answer the Government also confirmed that data held on the
NPD would not be deleted. Since then, the NPD has been used for a variety of
purposes (DfES 2005) including the identification of individual ‘gifted and talented’
pupils. (Dracup 2006) It will also be used to populate the national ‘Contactpoint’
database, which is described below.
‘Connexions’
The Learning and Skills Act 2000 provided for information about all teenagers to be
collected and shared without consent across a wide range of health, education, social
care and youth justice agencies in order to identify young people in the target age
group, and to spot those ‘disengaged’ from education.
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The Act was passed in order to set up the Connexions service, the aim of which
was to encourage participation in education, identify personal problems that might
create a ‘barrier to learning’ and offer:
a much better support service, founded around personal advisers, to guide
young people through their teenage years and help them get around the
problems that might stop them from making the most of learning. (Social
Exclusion Unit 1999:6)
Every young person is allocated a ‘personal adviser’ who brokers access to
services, and is responsible for carrying out an in-depth personal assessment of the
young person. This assessment process, known as the APIR (Assessment, Planning,
Implementation and Review), considers all areas of a young person’s life, including
mental health, sexual behaviour and criminal offending, and includes information
about his parents, family and friends.
Data is stored on the Connexions Customer Information System (CCIS).
Although consent is normally sought before information is shared with other
agencies, it is a single act of consent that grants all agencies access to the young
person’s electronic record until such time as consent is withdrawn. In the
Government’s words:
Young people have the right to see all information held about them by
Connexions, and are able to request correction of any inaccurate data. They are
not able to control access to Connexions partnerships’ databases, but
partnerships must ensure that all processing of information about young
people complies with data protection principles. (Timms, March 2002)
The Connexions service can be seen as a prototype for other childhood risk
management systems—those that use assessment tools and information-sharing in an
attempt to predict problems and offer early intervention.
‘Predicting’ children who may commit offences
A similar approach to Connexions has been developed in the youth justice sector
where there is an increasing emphasis on monitoring, screening, and identifying
children ‘at risk’ of delinquency. As the emphasis on the risk-management of
children has grown, an increasing number of schemes, each with their own
acronyms, have sprung up to monitor and divert children thought likely to commit
criminal offences.
Children aged 8–13 may be referred to their local Youth Inclusion and Support
Panel (YISP) if they are thought to be ‘at risk’ of offending. Following referral, the
local Youth Offending Team (YOT) will assess the child, using a screening tool
called ‘ONSET’, developed by the Youth Justice Board (YJB) and described as
follows:
Onset promotes the YJB’s prevention strategy by helping to identify risk
factors to be reduced and protective factors to be enhanced. It also provides
information which might be helpful in selecting appropriate interventions for
those identified as needing early intervention. (YJB 2003)
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If the child reaches the threshold for intervention, he will be referred onwards to a
local prevention programme.
YOTs in 70 local authority areas also run a preventive scheme called the ‘Youth
Inclusion Programme’ (for 13–16 s) and a ‘Junior Youth Inclusion Programme’ for
8–12 s (YIP and Junior YIP).
YIPs target the 50 young people in the area who are thought most likely to offend,
identified via a process called ‘ID50’ which involves referrals from local agencies,
or uses other information. The YJB ID50 guidance says:
There are clearly young people that are at risk but are not known by local
agencies: the YIP must endeavour to access these young people. We believe
that there is a considerable amount of local intelligence with regard to these
young people—the YIP should assume the role of an identifying agency by
collating information about these young people from local contacts,
residents, tenancy associations, community groups, street wardens, etc.
(YJB, undated)
In addition to the youth justice schemes, each area also has a ‘Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnership’ (CDRP), a Home Office initiative that, like the YOT,
involves all statutory agencies and also includes voluntary sector and community
representatives.
The CDRP is responsible for delivering a Home Office-designed scheme
called ‘Prolific and Other Priority Offenders’ (PPO) which is divided into three
tiers. The first tier, called ‘Prevent and Deter’, focuses on those thought to show
signs of being predisposed towards offending. There is no lower age limit for
entry to the scheme.
If a child has actually committed an offence, he will be screened with the
‘ASSET’ tool, (Youth Justice Board 2000) another profiling system that calculates
the likelihood of re-offending by allocating a score to various assessment categories.
The YJB has recently confirmed that future sentencing recommendations to the
courts will be based on a child’s ASSET score. (YJB 2008)
Police Databases
Different police forces have a range of systems for sharing information about
children who come to their attention. (FIPR, 2006: 72–74) Sometimes these are run
in partnership with other agencies: for example, the ‘Nipper’ database in York is run
in conjunction with the ‘Safer York Partnership’ and records information about
children at risk of harm, truants and those whose behaviour is described as
‘unacceptable’—which includes playing ball-games in the street.
The Metropolitan Police Service’s ‘MERLIN’ system records details of any
child who ‘comes to notice’ for any reason, ranging from child protection to
bullying; being present when premises are searched; where a police officer
thinks that a family member has mental health problems or that the family
needs social services involvement. The data on MERLIN is available to all
Metropolitan Police officers, to civilian staff on completion of training and
other local agencies if they have signed an information-sharing agreement with
the MPS.
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‘Every Child Matters’
In November 2003 the Government published a green paper entitled ‘Every Child
Matters’ (ECM) setting out an agenda that would, amongst other things, bring together
the approaches developed within the Connexions service and the youth justice sector in
order to monitor and intervene early in the lives of all children from birth to 18.
The green paper was ostensibly a response to Lord Laming’s report into the abuse
and murder of 8-year-old Victoria Climbie by her aunt and her aunt’s boyfriend, with
whom she was living, and was presented as a child protection agenda. In fact ECM
was the continuation of the Government’s ‘Identification, Referral and Tracking’
project that had been announced in August 2002, aimed at identifying children at
risk of social exclusion (Cabinet Office 2002).
ECM set out five outcomes for children, and changed the definition of ‘at risk’-
previously established by the Children Act 1989 as ‘at risk of significant harm from
neglect or abuse’—to mean at risk of not achieving the five outcomes. These were
set out as: being healthy; staying safe; enjoying and achieving; making a positive
contribution; achieving economic wellbeing. This subtle shift of definition passed
unnoticed by the general public, leading many to support the ECM agenda as a child
protection measure.
The subsequent Children Act 2004 reconfigured local authority and health agencies
into Children’s Trusts, charged with working together and sharing information about
children. A set of 26 Public Service Agreement Targets and 13 ‘Key Indicators’
(Department for Education and Skills 2005) was issued to local authorities, designed to
measure their progress towards achieving the five outcomes, giving the responsibility
for a child’s development to the Children’s Trust rather than the child’s parents.
The Information Sharing Index—now renamed ‘ContactPoint’
The Act also provided for the establishment of a national database containing basic
information about every child, details of their health and education providers and a
contact list for all the services involved with him. When these plans were scrutinised
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, they expressed concern that:
…if the justification for information-sharing about children is that it is always
proportionate where the purpose is to identify children who need welfare
services, there is no meaningful content left to a child’s Article 8 right to
privacy and confidentiality in their personal information. (JCHR 2004)
ContactPoint has been delayed by a series of security alerts—indeed, a
government-commissioned report from Deloitte, of which only the executive
summary has been published, confirms that it will not be possible to make the
system fully secure. (Deloitte 2008) The latest time estimate indicates that the
population of Contactpoint will begin in January 2009.
The Common Assessment Framework (CAF)
The Common Assessment Framework is a central feature of the ‘Every Child
Matters’ agenda, and can be seen as occupying the database layer beneath
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ContactPoint. Like the Connexions APIR and the Youth Justice Board profiling
tools, it is a comprehensive personal assessment system that facilitates information-
sharing by introducing a standardised set of criteria for agencies that have, until now,
had their own distinct in-house assessment procedures.
Where it appears to any practitioner that a child has needs that are beyond the
scope of that particular agency, or that the child is not progressing towards the ‘five
outcomes’, it is expected that a Common Assessment will be carried out in order to
assess what services should be provided. The government says that around half of
the child population needs such services at some point.
The CAF practitioner’s guide (HM Government 2006) gives a six-page list of the
assessment criteria, and although practitioners are advised that they should base their
assessment on evidence, several of the areas covered require the practitioner to form
an opinion on issues such as whether children’s relationships or parental behaviour is
‘appropriate’.
The CAF has been developed into an electronic format—the eCAF—and In July
2007 the Government announced that it is in the process of creating a single,
national database to hold all eCAF assessments.
Consent
A key issue with all of the existing and proposed database systems is that of gaining
the consent of those to whom the information refers. It is accepted that information
can and should be shared without consent when a child is at risk of significant harm
but, particularly in the youth justice sector, the threshold is often far lower than this
and any refusal to consent may in any case be overridden by an agency’s reliance on
a general, discretionary duty to prevent crime. YJB guidance on sharing information
about those thought to be potential young offenders advises that: ‘obtaining consent
remains a matter of good practice, as opposed to a requirement of law’ (YJB 2005).
The situation is further complicated by the issue of when an older child can give
consent in their own right. Settled law established in Gillick v West Norfolk and
Wisbech Area Health Authority (Gillick, All ER 1985) provided an exception to the
common law principle that parents are responsible for their under-age children by
allowing health professionals to provide contraception to under-age girls who
insisted that their parents should not be informed. The rules governing this
eventuality were strict.
Subsequent case law has developed the circumstances in which children can
consent to include other areas, but these have largely involved medical scenarios or
family law proceedings. In its non-statutory information-sharing guidance, the
Government asserts that a child from the age of 12 can usually be presumed able to
give valid consent to data-sharing without the need for parental involvement;
however, a legal study for the Nuffield Foundation which ARCH is currently
undertaking indicates that this whole area is highly contentious, and it is a vast over-
simplification to make such a bold assertion.
While it is important that a child or young person can seek help and advice in
confidence, and may be perfectly capable of consenting to counselling or medical
treatment, this is not the same as being competent to understand the full implications
of complex and/or ongoing acts of data-sharing. This data may not only be about the
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child herself. The practitioner guidance to the CAF (HM Government, 2006:18)
advises that:
Opinions should be recorded and marked accordingly (for example ‘Michael
said he thinks his dad is an alcoholic’).
Unless there are genuine concerns about possible maltreatment, should that
information be recorded at all without the consent of Michael’s father?
Child protection
It is a dangerous strategy to blur the boundaries between child protection and more
general welfare concerns. Few would dispute the necessity of sharing information
when a child is at risk of harm from abuse or serious neglect, but extending this
practice to children and families seeking services carries a number of risks.
If children or their parents fear that their privacy will be violated, or that they will
be disempowered by unwelcome intervention, there is a danger that help will only be
accessed when a crisis has been reached. If it deters access to services at an earlier
and more tractable stage, the strategy could prove entirely counterproductive.
Research with children using ChildLine, a confidential phone service, highlighted
the importance of confidentiality:
The offer of confidentiality is one of the prime reasons children call ChildLine.
One of the most common questions they ask of our counsellors is, ‘Are you
going to tell anyone about this?’ (Easton, Carpentieri 2004:26)
Since the advent of ‘Every Child Matters’, several studies of children’s views
have been carried out, all of them giving a clear message that children are worried
about their privacy:
A number of the young people indicated that they would be less likely to talk
to adults about their problems if they thought there was a risk that they might
be communicated to other adults. (Hilton and Mills 2006:28)
When we asked whether their decision to seek sexual health advice would be
affected if they knew health workers could pass details of sexually active
under-16 s to social workers [] 74% of under-16 s said they would be less
likely to seek advice in these circumstances (Brook 2005)
There was general agreement that it was essential to try to get permission
before sharing information, and only break refusal of permission in the most
exceptional circumstances. (Children’s Rights Alliance for England 2006:7)
Practitioners may fail to notice the children who are at risk of abuse in the welter
of information about low-level problems. Overloading an already under-staffed
social care system with low-level concerns would not appear to be a useful child
protection strategy. As the Information Commissioner famously remarked to the
Education and Skills Select Committee:
…if you are looking for a needle in a haystack I am not sure it is wise to make
the haystack even bigger. (Information Commissioner 2005)
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Regarding child protection as merely one possible element in a child’s needs
confuses two entirely different sets of circumstances. When social workers become
involved with a family in need of help, they aim to engage with a family in a
supportive and friendly manner. By contrast, when investigating allegations of
abuse, they must adopt a far more challenging approach in the awareness that parents
are likely to hide their wrongdoing and that the quality of evidence that is gathered
will be important in any subsequent court proceedings. It is essential for children’s
safety to maintain a clear distinction between protection and welfare.
There are risks that children’s data will be corruptly or carelessly disclosed, a
possibility acknowledged by the Government’s intention to shield the records of
some children:
Children who have a reason for not being traced—for example, where there is
a threat of domestic violence or where the child has a celebrity status—will be
able to have their details concealed. (Adonis 2006)
It is in any case misguided to believe that we can protect children from harm by
habitually intruding upon their private space; rather, we risk increasing their
potential to be victims. Abuse is about gross invasion of children’s personal
boundaries, and the best protection that we can offer is to empower them to
recognise such incursions for themselves. But if we are to help them to develop the
strong sense of self that they need to withstand or recover from abuse, we have to be
scrupulous about maintaining unambiguous boundaries ourselves. We cannot in all
seriousness say to a child: ‘you belong to yourself—but we can watch you, share
your secrets and discuss you behind your back.’
The right to privacy
Privacy is not an absolute right. It has to be balanced proportionately against the
human rights of other people and, particularly in the case of children, the subject’s
own vital interests. However, that does not mean that a child’s private life is
unimportant. Although a helpless baby can have little privacy, that situation
gradually changes as a child’s independence flowers into the firmly-closed door
and the private telephone conversations of adolescence. If children are to mature,
those of us responsible for raising them to adulthood can only welcome these signs
of a growing sense of competence and individuality.
Alan Westin made clear the significance of privacy for maturity and self-
determination when he said:
Changing personal needs and choices about self-revelation are what make
privacy such a complex condition, and a matter of personal choice. The
importance of that right to choose, both to the individual’s self-development
and to the exercise of responsible citizenship, makes the claim to privacy a
fundamental part of civil liberty in democratic society. (Westin 2003)
Privacy is the means by which we draw our personal boundaries, categorising
others into friend, acquaintance or potential threat and regulating our self-revelation
accordingly. It is about how we form relationships and about the way that we define
ourselves as distinct human beings. Westin rightly recognised it as a crucial part of
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development: without privacy, a child cannot learn to differentiate himself from
others. The ethicist, Jeffrey Reiman, makes this explicit when he says:
Privacy is necessary to the creation of selves out of human beings, since a self
is at least in part a human being who regards his existence, his thoughts, his
body, his actions as his own (Reiman 1976:39)
Psychoanalytic literature is rich in discussion of the fundamental importance of
boundaries to the development of ego-strength, self-awareness and creativity.
Donald Winnicott maintained that the gradual evolution of ‘the capacity to be
alone’ was essential to imagination, play and the ‘symbol-making’ at the heart of the
creative process. (Winnicott 1971) More, he believed it essential to the development
of an authentic self. (Winnicott 1965)
Anthony Storr similarly recognised the importance of solitude:
It appears therefore that some development of the capacity to be alone is
necessary if the brain is to function at its best, and if the individual is to fulfil
his highest potential. Human beings easily become alienated from their own
deepest needs and feelings. Learning, thinking, innovation and maintaining
contact with one’s own inner world are all facilitated by solitude. (Storr 1997:
28)
It is hard to see how the child who is made the object of persistent scrutiny can
ever feel truly alone in his internal world—or that the external world is anything
other than a dangerous place where he cannot manage unaided. What, then, are the
implications of surveillance for his development of integrated, creative selfhood?
We simply do not know the long-term effects of bringing a child up under
constant monitoring. In the rush to buy and sell the latest spy-gadgets and
information systems, the deepest threats have not even been considered. It is
meaningless to tell a child that they have independence of thought and the private
space to discover who they are, if we are habitually demonstrating through our
actions that this is simply not true.
Accentuating children’s passivity by relentless observation is a highly dangerous
experiment. In the guise of protection, we are in fact exposing children to risk and
habituating them to an unprecedented level of surveillance in adult life. On a deeper
level, we are impinging upon their development of personal boundaries. The events
that have created the potential for 24-h surveillance of children have occurred in a
piecemeal fashion, and it is now time to pull back and consider urgently just what
the deeper consequences might be of overriding the child’s right to privacy.
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